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DOBBS V. JACKSON WOMEN’S
HEALTH ORGANIZATION
AND THE LIKELY END OF THE
ROE V. WADE ERA
JEFFREY HANNAN*

INTRODUCTION
In Jackson Women’s Health Organization v. Dobbs, the Fifth Circuit
struck down a Mississippi law prohibiting abortion after the first fifteen
weeks of pregnancy, except in cases of medical emergency or severe
fetal abnormality.1 The Supreme Court now considers that ruling in a
case with massive ramifications for the status of abortion in the United
States.2 The question presented is broad: “[w]hether all pre-viability
prohibitions on elective abortions are unconstitutional.”3 In ruling on
this case, the Court will need to decide whether to overturn the two
leading cases on abortion law in the United States, Roe v. Wade and
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.4 Roe
established that prohibitions on abortion before the fetus becomes
viable violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.5
Casey provides the “undue burden” standard of review Courts apply to
determine the constitutionality of pre-viability abortion restrictions,
which Mississippi claims should be overturned.6
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1. 945 F.3d 265, 269 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. granted, 141 S. Ct. 2619 (2021).
2. Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 141 S. Ct. 2619, 2619 (2021) (granting cert.).
3. Brief for Petitioners at i, Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., No. 19-1392 (U.S.
July 22, 2021).
4. 410 U.S. 113 (1973), 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
5. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164.
6. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (plurality opinion); Brief for Petitioners, supra note 3, at 1. For a
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This commentary will examine the parties’ arguments and assess
several possible outcomes in this case. As the respondents convincingly
argue, the Court should uphold Roe and Casey and strike down the
Mississippi law. The Court should reach this conclusion by finding that
these cases were correctly decided, the precedents are workable, the
precedents have not been outmoded by legal or factual developments,
and the precedents engender significant reliance interests.
I. FACTS
In 2018, the Mississippi Legislature passed the “Gestational Age
Act.”7 This Act prohibits abortion after fifteen weeks’ gestation except
in cases of “medical emergency” or “severe fetal abnormality.”8
Medical emergencies involve cases in which a physician determines
that an abortion is necessary to preserve the life of a pregnant woman
whose life is endangered . . . or when the continuation of the pregnancy
will create a serious risk of substantial and irreversible impairment of
a major bodily function.”9 Severe fetal abnormality encompasses cases
in which the fetus is incapable of life outside the womb.10 Physicians
that violate this law are subject to sanctions and may have their medical
licenses revoked.11
The legislature based this prohibition on several medical findings
regarding prenatal development.12 The statute notes that abortion
“carries significant physical and psychological risks” to mothers.13 It
identifies potential medical complications from abortions.14 The law
states that the Legislature has deemed the usual means of performing
abortion after fifteen weeks’ gestation to be a “barbaric practice” that
is “dangerous” and “demeaning to the medical profession.”15
discussion of the undue burden standard, see infra Section III.
7. 2018 MISS. LAWS 393 (codified at MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-191 (2018)). This
commentary will refer to this statute as “the Mississippi statute,” “the Mississippi law,” “the
statute,” or “the law.”
8. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-191(4)(b) (2018).
9. Id. § 41-41-191(3)(j). The statute refers only to pregnant “women” throughout its text.
Similarly, both parties’ filings consider only pregnant “women,” as do all relevant cases cited in
this commentary. While this terminology excludes people of other gender identities who become
pregnant, this terminology will be used throughout this commentary to conform to the language
in these sources.
10. Id. § 41-41-191(3)(h).
11. Id. § 41-41-191(6).
12. Id. § 41-41-191(2)(b).
13. Id. § 41-41-191(2)(b)(ii).
14. Id. § 41-41-191(2)(b)(iv).
15. Id. § 41-41-191(2)(b)(i)(8).
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II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Respondents in this case are Jackson Women’s Health
Organization—the only abortion clinic in Mississippi—and one of the
Organization’s physicians.16 Respondents sued Thomas Dobbs, the
Mississippi State Health Officer, to prevent the enforcement of the
Gestational Age Act.17 Respondents argued that the statute violated
the substantive liberty rights of their patients by preventing abortion
prior to fetal viability, in direct contravention of the Due Process
Clause.18
After granting a temporary restraining order blocking
implementation of the statute,19 the District Court for the Southern
District of Mississippi granted a permanent injunction and struck down
the law for violating women’s Fourteenth Amendment due process
rights.20 The Fifth Circuit affirmed.21 The court distinguished between a
regulation on abortion prior to viability—which may be lawful if the
regulation does not impose an undue burden on the woman’s right to
choose an abortion—and a per se unconstitutional ban on pre-viability
abortions, which the court held described the Gestational Age Act.22
After the temporary restraining order, the Mississippi Legislature
enacted an even stricter law prohibiting physicians from performing
abortions after a fetus’s heartbeat is detected.23 The District Court
similarly ordered a preliminary injunction, which the Fifth Circuit
affirmed.24 On petition, the Supreme Court granted certiorari as to one

16. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, 9, Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 141 S.
Ct. 2619 (2021) (No. 19-1392).
17. Id. at ii. This commentary will refer to Petitioners as “Mississippi” throughout.
18. Complaint at 39, Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Currier, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45080,
aff’d sub nom. Jackson Woman’s Health Org. v. Dobbs, 945 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. granted
141 S. Ct. 2619 (U.S. 2021); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall . . . deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”).
19. Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Currier, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45080, at *3, aff’d sub
nom. Jackson Woman’s Health Org. v. Dobbs, 945 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. granted 141 S.
Ct. 2619 (U.S. 2021).
20. Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Currier, 349 F. Supp. 3d 536, 537–38 (S.D. Miss. 2018),
aff’d sub nom. Jackson Woman’s Health Org. v. Dobbs, 945 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. granted
141 S. Ct. 2619 (U.S. 2021).
21. Dobbs, 945 F.3d at 269.
22. Id. For a discussion of the “undue burden standard used to determine whether previability regulations on abortion are unconstitutional, see infra Section III.
23. 2019 MISS. LAWS 349 (codified at MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-34.1 (2021)). Fetal
heartbeats are usually detectable after approximately six weeks’ gestation. Jane Chertoff, How
Early Can You Hear Baby’s Heartbeat on Ultrasound and By Ear?, HEALTHLINE (Sept. 26, 2018),
https://www.healthline.com/health/pregnancy/when-can-you-hear-babys-heartbeat.
24. Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Dobbs, 951 F.3d 246, 248 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curium).
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question: “[w]hether all pre-viability prohibitions on elective abortions
are constitutional.”25
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The legality of abortion has evolved over time and has traditionally
depended in part on the stage of the fetus’s development.26 Abortion
in England was first criminalized in 1803.27 Abortion of a fetus after
“quickening”—the time when the fetus first recognizably moves in
utero, at approximately sixteen to eighteen weeks—constituted a
capital offense, whereas pre-quickening abortions were punished less
severely.28 In the United States, by 1840, only eight States had statutes
addressing abortion.29 By the 1950s, most states had banned abortion in
nearly all circumstances, unless necessary to save the life of the
mother.30
In the seminal case on abortion regulation in the United States, Roe
v. Wade, the Supreme Court recognized a woman’s fundamental right
to receive an abortion, subject to some limitations.31 In Roe, an
anonymous pregnant woman sought declaratory and injunctive relief
from Texas’s law prohibiting her from receiving an abortion absent
medical necessity.32 The Court stated that the Constitution guarantees
a fundamental right to personal privacy, emerging out of the confluence
of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.33 The
Court especially highlighted “the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of
personal liberty and restrictions upon state action” as a source of this
right.34 The Court found that this privacy right “encompass[es] a
woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”35
The Court noted challenges that pregnant women face, including “a
distressful life and future” due to an unwanted child, “[p]sychological
harm,” impacts on “mental and physical health” from childcare, and
25. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 16, at i (stating question one as “[w]hether
all pre-viability prohibitions on elective abortions are constitutional”); Dobbs v. Jackson
Women’s Health Org., 141 S. Ct. 2619, 2619 (2021) (granting certiorari as to question one).
26. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 133–35.
27. Id. at 136.
28. Id. at 132–33, 136.
29. Id. at 138–39.
30. Id. at 139.
31. Id. at 155.
32. Id. at 120.
33. Id. at 152.
34. Id. at 153.
35. Id.
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social stigmatization for unwed mothers.36 The Court, however, also
recognized the government’s “important interests in safeguarding
health, in maintaining medical standards, and in protecting potential
life.”37
To reconcile these competing interests, the Court in Roe adopted a
trimester framework.38 Under the trimester framework, state
governments were prohibited from banning or regulating firsttrimester abortions.39 Yet, state governments could regulate secondtrimester abortions in the interest of protecting the mother’s health.40
Then, after the fetus becomes viable at the beginning of the third
trimester, states could outright ban abortions to protect the fetus’s
interest in “potential life,” except when abortions are necessary to
protect the mother’s life or health.41 This structure reflected the Court’s
reasoning that the government’s interest in safeguarding health and
protecting potential life increased as the pregnancy progressed.42 The
Court struck down the Texas law because it prohibited elective
abortions in the first and second trimesters.43
The Court abandoned the trimester framework in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.44 In Casey, five
abortion clinics and one physician asked the Court to overturn a
Pennsylvania law imposing several reporting, notification, and
informed-consent requirements on women seeking abortions.45 The
statute also imposed reporting requirements on facilities that provided
abortions.46
In deciding whether to overturn precedent, the Court considered
several factors. The Court primarily examined whether the resulting
precedent proved workable in practice, whether subsequent legal or
factual developments made outmoded the existing precedent, and
whether the precedent engendered significant reliance interests since
its adoption.47
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
Id. at 154.
Id. at 163.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 163–64.
Id.
Id. at 164.
505 U.S. 833, 873 (1992) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 844–45 (majority opinion).
Id. at 844.
Id. at 855.
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The Justices splintered in their decision. A five-justice majority
agreed that stare decisis compelled the Court to adhere to the “essential
holding” of Roe.48 The Court clarified that the Due Process Clause
protects a woman’s right to abortion before viability, the State may
prohibit abortions after viability, and at all times the State has a
legitimate interest in protecting both maternal and fetal health.49
Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter went further, holding that a
state may not enact regulations that impose an “undue burden” on a
woman’s ability to choose to obtain an abortion before viability.50 The
undue burden standard—a form of heightened scrutiny—asks whether
a regulation “has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle
in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”51 The
three justices applied this standard in voting to strike down
Pennsylvania’s requirement that abortion seekers notify their spouses
because it granted husbands an effective veto over wives’ abortion
rights and may discourage many women from seeking abortions.52 The
plurality explained that “in a large fraction of the cases in which [the
provision] is relevant” it imposes an undue burden.53
The undue burden standard remained unchanged for over two
decades until Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt.54 In Hellerstedt, the
Court struck down a Texas statute requiring that physicians performing
abortions have admitting privileges at a hospital within thirty miles of
the abortion location and that abortion facilities maintain the same
health and safety standards as ambulatory surgical centers.55 In
applying the undue burden standard, the Court adopted a balancing
test—examining both the burdens and benefits of the law in proportion
to one another.56 Using this analysis, the Court found that the

48. Id. at 846.
49. See id. at 874 (plurality opinion) (“Only where state regulation imposes an undue
burden on a woman’s ability to make this decision [to receive an abortion] does the power of the
State reach into the heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.”).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 877.
52. Id. at 897.
53. Id. at 895. Specifically, the opinion notes that in this “large fraction” analysis, the
provision “must be judged by reference to those for whom it is an actual rather than an irrelevant
restriction.” Id. This means that courts should determine the denominator in this analysis by
looking not to the entire pool of women under the government’s jurisdiction, but rather to the
pool of women who will actually be affected by the restriction. Id. at 894–95.
54. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
55. Id. At 2300.
56. See id. at 2309 (“The rule announced in Casey . . . requires that courts consider the
burdens a law imposes on abortion access together with the benefits those laws confer.”).
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requirements of the statute did not meet the undue burden standard
because “neither of these provisions confers medical benefits sufficient
to justify the burdens upon [abortion] access that each imposes.”57
IV. PETITIONERS’ ARGUMENT
Petitioners, representing the Mississippi government, chiefly argue
that the Court should overturn Roe and Casey,58 and that laws
restricting pre-viability abortions should be assessed under a rational
basis standard of review.59 Alternatively, Petitioners argue that even if
the Court upholds the undue burden standard for abortion restrictions,
the Court should at least reject a bright line rule holding that all previability abortion bans are unconstitutional.60
A. The Statute Meets Rational Basis Review
Petitioners claim that sufficient justification exists to overcome
stare decisis and overrule Roe’s and Casey’s requirements that
heightened scrutiny be applied to abortion restrictions.61 Their
argument primarily asserts that these cases were wrongly decided, the
current doctrine is “hopelessly unworkable,” “[d]ecades of progress”
have made the Court’s precedents obsolete, and “[r]eliance interests do
not support retaining” these precedents.62
First, Petitioners assert that Roe was wrongly decided because the
Due Process Clause only protects rights that are either clearly
enumerated in the Constitution or “ground[ed] in history and
tradition.”63 They argue that Roe’s “sweeping” application of the right
to privacy is, conversely, “unmoored from constitutional text, structure,
history, and tradition.”64 Petitioners then assert that abortion is “a
unique act” because it “destroy[s] human life,” differentiating abortion
rights from all previous privacy or liberty rights recognized by the

57. Id.at 2300.
58. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 3, at 1.
59. Id. at 11. For a description of the rational basis review courts apply to statutes challenged
under the Fourteenth Amendment, see Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997)
(holding that the Constitution requires that statutes affecting non-fundamental liberty interests
be “rationally related to legitimate government interests”).
60. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 3, at 46 (“[T]his Court could reject a viability rule,
clarify the undue-burden standard, and reverse on the ground that the [Gestational Age] Act does
not im-pose an undue burden.”)
61. Id. at 14.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 15.
64. Id. at 15–16.
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Court.65 Petitioners conclude that because Roe and Casey fail to
account for this distinction, they were incorrectly adjudicated and
should not compel the court to adopt heightened scrutiny for abortion
restrictions.66
Second, Petitioners assert that the Court’s abortion precedents are
“unworkable”67 because there is “no objective way to decide whether
a burden is ‘undue.’”68 Petitioners assert that the Court faces an
“administrability problem” in articulating “what Casey even means”
given the competing interpretations of the undue burden standard in
past cases applying it.69 Petitioners contend that heightened scrutiny for
abortion restrictions is also unworkable because it fails to
“accommodate state interests” by “diminish[ing] a State’s pre-viability
interests in protecting unborn life, women’s health, and the medical
profession’s integrity.”70 According to Petitioners, these interests are
matters of policy and therefore should be left to state legislatures rather
than to the courts.71 Petitioners state that it is important that state
legislatures are unencumbered by “decades-stale” precedents in
adapting existing laws—especially in the wake of advances in medicine
and technology, which have changed society’s collective understanding
of gestational development.72
Third, Petitioners assert that legal and factual developments since
Roe and Casey have rendered the Court’s abortion precedents
outmoded.73 Petitioners note that since Roe and Casey, the Court has
never held that privacy or liberty interests justify a constitutional right
to end human life—be it actual or “potential” life.74 Petitioners also
point to factual developments to support their claim that the Court’s
precedents are obsolete.75 Petitioners claim that modern social policies,
such as laws preventing pregnancy discrimination and mandating
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 19 (quoting Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 792 (2009)).
68. Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (plurality opinion)).
69. Id. (citing June Medical Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2120–32, 2135–42, 2154–
65 (2020) (plurality opinion)). Petitioners note that the plurality opinion and Chief Justice
Roberts’s concurring opinion both concluded that the statute imposed an undue burden, but
arrived at this conclusion after taking “different view[s]” of Casey, both of which differed from
the dissent’s view. Id.
70. Id. at 20–21.
71. Id. at 21.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 28.
74. Id. (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 325 (1980)).
75. Id. at 29.
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parental leave, reduce unwanted pregnancies which could force women
into “a distressful life and future,” a primary concern for the Court in
Roe.76 Petitioners also emphasize “safe haven” laws which allow
women to leave unwanted infants in the care of the state, as well as the
increased ease of access to effective contraceptives.77 They claim these
laws show that abortion is not needed to “enable ‘women to participate
equally’” in the workforce and in social life.78 According to Petitioners,
this statement contradicts the assumptions that informed the plurality
opinion in Casey.79 Last, Petitioners discuss medical developments that
have evolved since Casey, particularly scientific progress in assessing
when fetuses are capable of experiencing pain.80
Fourth, Petitioners state that no reliance interests compel the Court
to retain heightened scrutiny for abortion challenges.81 Petitioners
argue that claims of substantial reliance on the stability of the Court’s
precedents are severely undermined because abortion has always been
contentious and decided in the courts on “the narrowest of margins.”82
Petitioners also question whether reliance should apply to abortions at
all, because abortion is “customarily … an unplanned response to …
unplanned activity,”83 rather than a planned activity around which
individuals could reasonably form “long-term plans and
commitments.”84 Petitioners note that overturning Roe and Casey
would “not itself bar a single abortion”; rather, it would merely allow
states to decide for themselves which abortion laws should be
codified.85
Given these considerations, Petitioners assert that the court should
reject heightened scrutiny in favor of rational basis review for abortion
restrictions.86 Petitioners conclude that the Gestational Age Act
satisfies rational basis scrutiny because it rationally relates to the state’s
interest in protecting the lives of the unborn,87 protecting women’s

76. Id. (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973)).
77. Id.
78. Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992)).
79. See id. at 30 (asserting that these contraceptive developments “undercut” Casey’s
assumption about the necessity of abortion).
80. Id. (quoting MKB Mgmt. Corp. v. Stenehjem, 795 F.3d 768, 774 (8th Cir. 2015)).
81. Id. at 31.
82. Id. at 31–32 (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 829 (1991)).
83. Id. at 34 (quoting Payne, 501 U.S. at 856) (alteration in original).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 35–36.
86. Id. at 36.
87. Id. at 36–37.
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health,88 and protecting the integrity of the medical profession.89
B. Viability is Not a Barrier to Prohibiting Abortions
Alternatively, Petitioners contend that pre-viability abortion
prohibitions may pass heightened scrutiny and that the Gestational
Age Act meets this standard.90 Petitioners argue that even if there exists
a substantive right to abortion, nothing in the Constitution or in
historical precedent mandates that viability serve as the point at which
the undue burden test must begin to apply. Therefore, Petitioners
contend, pre-viability restrictions are not per se unconstitutional.91
Petitioners criticize viability as a meaningless cutoff point.92 They argue
that even after viability a fetus still relies on “artificial aid” to survive,93
and consequently, pre-viability fetuses are similar to post-viability
fetuses; they simply “need[] a little more help.”94
Petitioners argue that the Gestational Age Act should be upheld
under two alternative theories even if the Court maintains the viability
line as the cutoff point.95 First, Petitioners assert that the statute meets
any level of scrutiny—even strict scrutiny—because the state’s interests
in protecting unborn life and maternal health, as well as the “medical
profession’s integrity,” are “compelling” at fifteen weeks of
pregnancy.96 Petitioners claim the act is narrowly tailored to these
interests because it exempts abortions in cases of medical emergency
or severe fetal abnormality.97
Second, Petitioners claim that the statute meets the undue burden
standard articulated in Casey.98 Petitioners note that Casey’s undue
burden standard does not prohibit pre-viability legislation.99 For
example, Casey upheld prohibitions on abortions for minors without
88. Id. at 37.
89. Id.
90. See id. at 38 (asserting that the Court should reverse the Fifth Circuit’s judgment that
the statute is unconstitutional even if it continues to apply heightened scrutiny).
91. Id. at 39.
92. Id. at 40.
93. Id. (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973)).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 45–46.
96. Id. at 46. For a discussion of strict scrutiny, see Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155,
171 (2015) (stating that strict scrutiny requires that the Government prove that a law is “narrowly
tailored” to a “compelling interest” (quoting Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v.
Bennet, 564 U.S. 721, 734 (2011))).
97. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 3, at 46.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 46–47.
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parental consent or a judicial bypass, regardless of viability.100
Petitioners explain that pre-viability restrictions have been
constitutionally permitted where the restriction is not a substantial
obstacle in a “large fraction” of relevant cases.101 Petitioners apply this
analysis to the Gestational Age Act, and conclude that because
Respondents only provide abortions up to 16 weeks and “at most 4.5%
of the women who obtained abortions from respondents did so after 15
weeks’ gestation,”102 the statute does not impose a burden on “a
significant number of women.”103 Furthermore, Petitioners point to
evidence that over 90% of abortions in 2018 took place at or before 13
weeks’ gestation, and conclude that there is no undue burden because
most women seeking abortions are not affected by the statute.104
V. RESPONDENTS’ ARGUMENT
Respondents begin their brief by asking that the Court dismiss the
case entirely, noting that Petitioners originally only argued for
overruling Roe and Casey in a “threadbare footnote” within their
Petition for Certiorari.105 Respondents state that the Court has
previously thrown out cases when petitioners rely on wholly different
arguments from those expressed in their petitions.106 In the remainder
of the brief, Respondents chiefly argue that the Court should uphold
Roe and Casey.107 Respondents then assert that Mississippi’s proposed
alternative legal schemes are legally insufficient.108
A. There is No Justification for Overruling Casey and Roe
Respondents emphatically state that Roe and Casey are settled law,
particularly with regard to pre-viability abortion restrictions.109

100. Id.
101. Id. at 47 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895
(1992) (plurality opinion)).
102. Id.
103. Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 895).
104. Id. (citing CDCs Abortion Surveillance System FAQs: Abortion Surveillance—Findings
and Reports, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (Nov. 25, 2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/data_stats/abortion.htm
[https://perma.cc/33EEZ2PY]).
105. Brief for Respondents at 11, Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., No. 19-1392 (U.S.
filed Sept. 13, 2021) (citing Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 16, at 5–6 n.1).
106. Id. (quoting Visa Inc. v. Osborn, 137 S. Ct. 289, 289–90 (2016) (mem.)).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 43 ( “Its barebones discussion of its proposed alternatives highlights that any
abandonment of viability would be no different than overturning Casey and Roe entirely.”).
109. See id. at 4–5 (“For all the reasons the Court so deliberately set forth in Casey, that
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Respondents argue that prohibiting abortion bans before viability is
the “central principle” underlying these cases.110 Respondents
emphasize that Casey makes clear that “viability marks the earliest
point at which the State’s interest in fetal life is constitutionally
adequate to justify” abortion bans.111
Next, Respondents reject Mississippi’s arguments for overruling
the viability line.112 Respondents contend that the Court in Casey
already considered and rejected all the arguments Mississippi
presented in upholding Roe’s “central holding” that pre-viability
abortions cannot be banned by law.113 In response to Petitioners’
contention that the viability line lacks grounding in the Court’s
jurisprudential history, Respondents highlight a litany of Fourteenth
Amendment cases.114 Pointing out that these cases guarantee “the right
to make family decisions and the right to physical autonomy,”115
Respondents posit that “‘physical autonomy’ and ‘bodily integrity’ are
integral components of” the Due Process Clause’s liberty
protections,116 implicitly analogizing to abortion.
Respondents next refute Petitioners’ argument that Casey and
Roe’s viability line is unworkable.117 Respondents differentiate
between pre-viability abortion regulations—examples of which
Petitioners cited in their brief to show Casey’s unworkability—and previability abortion bans, which have never been upheld and do not fall
under the purview of the undue burden test.118
Respondents refute Petitioners’ claims that factual developments
make Roe and Casey obsolete.119 In response to Petitioners’ contention
that doctors’ understanding of when viability occurs may change as
science progresses, Respondents assert that viability has consistently
decision must be taken to have settled the question presented.”).
110. Id. at 9.
111. Id. at 13 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860
(1992) (majority opinion)).
112. Id. at 15.
113. See id. at 16 (“After carefully considering every argument for overruling Roe—including
criticisms of its constitutional analysis and substantive due process in general and claims related
to advances in science and medicine—the Court decided to preserve Roe’s central holding that
‘the woman has a right to choose to terminate her pregnancy’ up until viability.” (citing Casey,
505 U.S. at 870)(plurality opinion))).
114. Id. at 17–18.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 18.
117. Id. at 22.
118. Id. at 23.
119. Id.
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been understood to occur at twenty-three to twenty-four weeks since
Casey was decided, suggesting that our current estimate is settled
science.120 Further, Respondents cite Casey’s holding that “‘[w]henever
it may occur,’ viability ‘marks the earliest point at which the State’s
interest in fetal life is constitutionally adequate to justify a legislative
ban on’ abortion.”121
In response to Petitioners’ claims about medical advances in
understanding fetal development, including fetal pain, Respondents
reiterate that the Court considered and rejected these arguments in
Roe and in Casey.122 Regarding the widespread adoption of
contraceptives over the past several decades, which Petitioners claim
reduces the need for abortion access, Respondents note that currently
over one in four women choose to end pregnancies, demonstrating that
abortion is necessary for many.123
Respondents conclude their defense of Roe and Casey by
emphasizing that these precedents protect women’s ability to
participate equally in society.124 Respondents highlight the many harms
that women face without access to pre-viability abortions, including
greater health risks, loss of educational and career opportunities,
increased likelihood of experiencing poverty, and negative economic
impacts.125
B. Petitioners Offer No Alternative to the Viability Line that Would
Sustain a Stable Right to Abortion
In their second section, Respondents reject Petitioners’ alternative
grounds for upholding the Gestational Age Act should the Court
uphold Roe and Casey.126 First, Respondents state that if the Court
declines to determine which standard of review should apply to
abortion restrictions, future courts will have no guidance in assessing
other states’ abortion restrictions.127 Per Respondents, leaving the
standard of review undetermined—even without directly overturning

120. Id. at 24–25 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
860 (1992) (plurality opinion)).
121. Id. at 24 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 860).
122. Id. at 32.
123. Id. at 35.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 38–40.
126. Id. at 43.
127. See id. (arguing that Petitioners’ “proposal would leave women, state officials, and the
lower courts at sea”).
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Roe and Casey—would signal that “anything goes” and open the door
for future courts to uphold bans at any stage of pregnancy.128
Respondents emphasize that this uncertainty would lead to significant
burdens on women seeking abortions and incentivize many women to
perform abortions outside the medical system, posing great health risks
and potential criminal liability.129
Respondents similarly refute Mississippi’s alternative solution that
the Court uphold the statute under an undue burden analysis.130 In
response to Petitioners’ claim that relatively few women will be
impacted should Respondents be forced to end abortion care a week
earlier—at fifteen weeks rather than the sixteen week cutoff currently
used at Jackson Women’s Health Organization—Respondents stress
that constitutional protections exist regardless of the size of the
protected minority.131 Respondents conclude that upholding the ban
under either of Petitioners’ proposed alternatives would functionally
result in the same consequences as overturning Roe and Casey
entirely—”attempts by half the states in the Nation to forbid abortion
entirely, and a judiciary left without tools to manage the resulting
litigation.”132
VI. ORAL ARGUMENT
A. Petitioners’ Oral Argument
The Justices’ questions at oral argument suggested that a majority
of the Court intends to overturn Roe and Casey in their entirety. The
Mississippi Solicitor General, Scott Stewart, began oral argument by
reiterating that Mississippi not only believes the Gestational Age Act
is constitutional, but also that Roe and Casey should be overturned.133
Justice Sotomayor pointedly asked him whether the Court would
“survive the stench” created by reversing precedent on such a
politically divisive issue, especially when the sponsors of the challenged
bill directly stated they were enacting the law “because we have new
justices” on the Supreme Court.134 During this exchange, she also stated
128. Id. at 45.
129. Id. at 46.
130. Id. at 47.
131. Id. at 49.
132. Id. at 50.
133. Transcript of Oral Argument at 4–6, Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., No. 191392 (U.S. argued Dec. 1, 2021).
134. Id. at 14–15.
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that Casey already “went through every one of” the stare decisis factors
in assessing whether to uphold Roe, and Mississippi was simply
articulating that it disagreed with the Court’s determination.135
The conservative Justices asked Mr. Stewart several rhetorical
questions to poke holes in the liberal Justices’ defenses of Roe and
Casey.136 Justices Sotomayor and Breyer then pressed Stewart to
distinguish Roe from the other Substantive Due Process cases
Mississippi argued should still be upheld.137 Justice Kagan added that,
to her, it appeared that the United States was in exactly the same
situation now as it was in when Roe was decided, except that fifty
additional years of precedent have accumulated in the interim.138
Chief Justice Roberts asked Mr. Stewart to explain why Mississippi
focused so heavily on overturning Roe and Casey in its brief when it
hardly mentioned such a prospect in its petition for certiorari.139 Mr.
Stewart did not mention the change in the Court’s composition that
occurred between the two filings.140 He instead insisted that Mississippi
was simply trying to present every possible argument to support its
law.141
Justice Kavanaugh asked whether Mississippi believed the
Constitution permitted the government to “itself prohibit abortion”
uniformly across the country—Mr. Stewart said it did not.142 Justice
Kavanaugh then suggested that Mississippi was essentially arguing that
the Constitution was “silent” on abortion and that therefore the issue
135. Id. at 16.
136. See id. at 19 (“CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: . . . [W]as [viability] an issue in [Roe]? . . .
MR. STEWART: . . . My understanding is no. . . . CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: In fact, if I
remember correctly, . . . Justice Blackmun said that the viability line was—actually was dicta.”);
see also id. at 22–24. In this exchange, Justice Sotomayor stated that many Due Process cases rely
on extratextual Constitutional interpretations, and that overturning Roe would threaten these
cases. Id. at 22–23. Justice Barrett interjected and asked Mr. Stewart whether he believed
overturning Roe would have such an effect; he replied that it would not. Id. at 24.
137. Id. at 26–27. Specifically, Justice Sotomayor asked Mr. Stewart to explain why his
argument would not also necessitate overturning Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965);
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); and Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015). Transcript
of Oral Argument, supra note 133, at 27.
138. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 133, at 34.
139. Id. at 37.
140. After Mississippi filed its Petition for Certiorari, but before it filed its merits brief,
Justice Ginsburg died and was replaced with Justice Barrett. See Barbara Sprunt, Amy Coney
Barrett Confirmed To Supreme Court, Takes Constitutional Oath, NPR (Oct. 26, 2020, 8:07 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2020/10/26/927640619/senate-confirms-amy-coney-barrett-to-the-supremecourt (stating that Justice Barrett was confirmed on October 26, 2021). For further discussion of
this change and its potential impacts on this case, see discussion infra Section VII.A.
141. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 133, at 38.
142. Id. at 43.
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should be decided on a state-by-state basis.143
B. Respondents’ Oral Argument
Arguing for the Respondents, Center for Reproductive Rights
attorney Julie Rikelman stated that Mississippi’s law was
unconstitutional for three reasons: stare decisis supports Roe and Casey,
these cases were correctly decided, and the law would harm women.144
Chief Justice Roberts pressed Ms. Rikelman on why Respondents
believed viability was an appropriate point after which women’s right
to choose to have an abortion may be restricted, noting the United
States “share[s] that [viability] standard with the People’s Republic of
China and North Korea.”145 Ms. Rikelman responded that only a brightline viability rule would be workable for the courts, and predicted that
if Mississippi’s 15-week ban were allowed, nothing would stop states
from enacting bans even sooner in pregnancy.146
Justice Barrett questioned why safe haven laws do not nullify
Respondents’ arguments about the burdens of raising an unwanted
child, because mothers can simply relinquish their babies to the state.147
Justice Gorsuch asked why the undue burden standard could not
simply be applied to pre-viability abortion bans.148 Justice Alito
continued the Chief Justice’s line of questioning about the viability line.
He posited that the mother’s interests do not change on the day of
viability, and then asked what philosophical arguments support
Respondents’ contention that the fetus’s interest in life manifests at
viability.149 Ms. Rikelman responded that viability is the most logical
point between conception and birth for the government to draw a clear
line.150
Justice Thomas asked whether Respondents believed the right to
abortion was founded in the right to privacy, autonomy, or some other
protection.151 Ms. Rikelman stated that abortion is protected by the
right to “liberty” ensured by the Fourteenth Amendment, emphasizing

143. Id.
144. Id. at 47–48.
145. Id. at 53–54.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 55–56. For a discussion of safe haven laws, see supra notes 77–79 and
accompanying text.
148. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 133, at 62.
149. Id. at 65–66.
150. Id. at 66.
151. Id. at 71.
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that in past cases regarding “family, marriage, and childrearing” the
Court has applied Due Process at “a higher level of generality.”152
As he did during Mr. Stewart’s argument, Justice Kavanaugh asked
why the Court should not simply take a “neutral” position and leave
abortion for the states to decide individually, given the divisiveness of
abortion law and the Constitution’s silence on the issue.153 Turning to
stare decisis, he continued by listing several landmark cases in which
the Court overturned precedent on constitutional issues, and asked why
the Court shouldn’t similarly overturn Roe if it concluded it was
“seriously wrong.”154
After Ms. Rikelman’s argument, United States Solicitor General
Elizabeth Prelogar argued on behalf of the United States in support of
the Respondents. Her argument emphasized the fundamentality of
abortion rights and the negative consequences Respondents believed
would occur should the Court overturn precedent.155 The most
significant exchange was a contentious line of inquiry in which Justice
Alito tested General Prelogar’s interpretation of what being “wrongly
decided” means for a case in stare decisis analysis.156 He asked whether
a decision being “egregiously wrong”—without more—was sufficient
to overturn a past decision.157 He then asked, if not, whether a Court
deciding a segregation case immediately after deciding Plessy v.
Ferguson could overrule Plessy despite no changes in legal or factual
circumstances since the case was decided.158 General Prelogar first
pointed to the facts that “had become clear” about separate-but-equal
segregation after Plessy as sufficient to overrule the case.159 She later
clarified that she meant that the facts already supported overruling
Plessy “the moment it was decided.”160 She went on to state that the
Court has never overruled precedent solely because it concluded the

152. Id. at 73.
153. Id. at 77; see also id. at 107 (“JUSTICE KAVANAUGH: . . . When you have those two
interests at stake and both are important, as you acknowledge, why not—why should this Court
be the arbiter rather than Congress, the state legislatures, state supreme courts, the people being
able to resolve this?”).
154. Id. at 79–80.
155. See id. at 84–85 (arguing that the right to choose is “fundamental” and that the “realworld effects of overruling [Roe] and [Casey] would be severe and swift”).
156. Id. at 93.
157. Id. at 91.
158. Id. at 92; see also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 548 (1896). In Plessy, the Court upheld
a Louisiana law that segregated passenger cars on trains by race. Id.
159. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 133, at 92.
160. Id. at 93.
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previous decision was wrong.161
In questioning General Prelogar, Chief Justice Roberts made clear
that “the thing that is at issue before us today is [a ban at] 15 weeks,”
casting aside General Prelogar’s warnings about subsequent state bans
at even earlier stages that will likely follow should the Court overrule
Roe.162 Justice Gorsuch concluded his questioning by asking if
Respondents would be able to articulate any other principled line if the
Court were to strike down the viability line.163 General Prelogar
reiterated that viability is the only principled line that can be drawn.164
VII. ANALYSIS
A. How the Court Should Rule
The Court should refuse to overturn Roe and Casey and
subsequently uphold the lower courts’ rulings striking down the
Mississippi law. Petitioners have failed to convincingly assert that these
precedents are unworkable, have been outmoded by legal and factual
developments, or have not engendered significant reliance interests.165
Perhaps Mississippi’s most serious argumentative error is
conflating an abortion regulation with an abortion ban.166 In asserting
that the Court’s precedents are unworkable, Petitioners primarily
attack the undue burden standard announced in Casey.167 Yet, this
standard only applies to abortion regulations. Casey makes clear that
“a State may not prohibit any woman from making the ultimate
decision to terminate her pregnancy before viability.”168 Even accepting
Petitioners’ assertion that the undue burden standard is applicable here
and that “[t]here is no objective way to decide whether a burden is

161. Id. at 94–95.
162. Id. at 101.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1992)
(plurality opinion) (noting that in assessing whether to overrule a past ruling, the Court considers
the rule’s “workability,” whether it is subject to “reliance,” and whether laws of facts have
changed since the rule was decided so as to make the rule inapplicable).
166. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 105, at 23 (noting this inconsistency); see also
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 11, No. 19-1392 (U.S.
filed Sept. 20, 2021) (noting the same).
167. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 3, at 19–22 (discussing the workability of heightened
scrutiny for abortion restrictions while failing to distinguish between a mere regulation and an
outright ban).
168. Casey, 505 U.S. at 879 (emphasis added).
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‘undue,’”169 this does not necessitate overturning Casey. A ban on
abortions at fifteen weeks necessarily imposes a “substantial obstacle
in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus,”170 and
therefore automatically fails to meet the undue burden standard.171
Thus, the standard remains workable for laws like the Gestational Age
Act.
Mississippi also neglects to articulate any factual developments
since Roe and Casey that require that the Court overturn these
precedents. Petitioners point to “safe haven” laws enacted after Casey,
claiming they nullify the burdens of raising an unwanted child.172
However, this ignores the fact that adoption was available to mothers
when Roe was decided, and the Court determined that the burdens of
pregnancy alone were sufficient to protect abortion rights.173 Similarly,
the increase in access to contraception since Roe and Casey is not
helpful for Petitioners’ argument. As Respondents point out,
contraceptives are not universally available for all women—especially
not for women of lower socioeconomic status.174 Abortion remains an
essential tool in preventing the burdens of unwanted pregnancy and
childbirth, as evidenced by the fact that one in four women today have
chosen to receive an abortion,175 and by the fact that thousands of
abortions are performed in Mississippi every year.176
Respondents are also correct in refuting Mississippi’s assertion that
no reliance interests exist based on Roe and Casey. Mississippi is wrong
that individuals have not relied on Roe and Casey because of the
Court’s “fractured, unsettled jurisprudence” on abortion restrictions.
Although the Court has disagreed in applying the undue burden
standard to abortion regulations,177 the Court has never wavered on

169. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 3, at 19 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 877).
170. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
171. See id. (defining an undue burden as imposing a substantial obstacle on the woman
seeking an abortion).
172. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 3, at 29.
173. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 133, at 57.
174. Brief for Respondents, supra note 105, at 35.
175. Id.
176. See 2019 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, ABORTION SURVEILLANCE
— UNITED STATES ANN. REP. 14 tbl.2 (tallying over 3,000 abortions performed in Mississippi in
the previous year).
177. Compare June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2112–13 (2020) (approving
of the District Court’s approach to determining an undue burden, which it conducted by assessing
both whether the statute imposes a “substantial obstacle” as well as whether it imparts any
“health-related benefit[s]”), with id. at 2135–36 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (stating that Casey
requires no such balancing test, and that the undue burden standard instead mandates only that
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Casey’s prohibition of pre-viability abortion bans, so reliance based on
this precedent is reasonable. Mississippi is correct that abortions are in
almost all cases an “unplanned response” to “unplanned activity.”178
Access to abortion, however, permeates decision-making in a variety of
ways, affecting personal and professional decisions in a profound
manner. Women choose to enter relationships, move in with partners,
embark on certain career paths, and much more with the knowledge
that abortion access frees them from the burdens of an unplanned
pregnancy. It is overly myopic to doubt the existence of reliance on Roe
and Casey merely because the specific act of becoming pregnant is
often unanticipated.
Similarly, Respondents correctly counter Petitioners’ alternative
argument that the viability line should be discarded.179 Petitioners’ first
alternative—that the Court uphold the statute and leave the standard
of review issue for another day—would leave courts with no standard
to apply to the numerous other abortion prohibitions that would
immediately come into effect in other states.180 Their second
alternative—that the Court should uphold the statute under the undue
burden standard because it doesn’t impose a substantial obstacle for “a
significant number of women”181—is incongruous with how that
language was applied in Casey. In Casey, the Court used this “large
fraction” language to identify the pool of women to be assessed in the
undue burden analysis. Regarding the spousal notification requirement
at issue in Casey, the Court asked what proportion of women would
face a substantial obstacle among the pool of “married women seeking
abortions who do not wish to notify their husbands of their intentions
and who do not qualify for one of the statutory exceptions to the notice
requirement.”182 These women form the denominator of the equation;
the test asks how many women who are impacted by the restriction are
unduly burdened. The analogous cohort in Dobbs is the pool of women
who want or need to receive abortions after fifteen weeks. Among
these women, 100% face a substantial obstacle from the statute,
the Court assess whether the statute imposes a “substantial obstacle” to abortion access).
178. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 3, at 34 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992) (plurality opinion)).
179. See id. at 38 (arguing that the Court should reject any rule that would bar a state from
prohibiting elective abortions pre-viability, regardless of how it decides on the question of
scrutiny for abortion regulations).
180. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 105, at 41–43 (noting laws in multiple states
prohibiting abortion before viability).
181. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 3, at 47 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 895).
182. Casey, 505 U.S. at 895.
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namely, that the statute makes their abortion illegal.183
Last, there is a strong case that Mississippi used improper means to
argue that Roe and Casey should be wholly overruled. Mississippi’s
Petition for Certiorari was filed on June 15, 2020,184 while Justice
Ginsburg was still alive and serving on a Court where Chief Justice
Roberts served as the ideological “swing vote” on abortion cases.185
Months before Petitioners filed their merits brief in July 2021,186 Justice
Ginsburg died and was replaced by Justice Barrett, marking a rightward
shift in the Court’s alignment on abortion. Petitioners likely thought
that the Court’s new composition would be more receptive to an
argument for overruling Roe entirely, so they changed direction to
emphasize this option in their merits brief.187 Courts have declined to
accept arguments made in this manner in the past.188 The Court should
also do so here, as Petitioners’ approach—and their attempt to hide
their obvious motivations189—represent the worst in judicial
gamesmanship and further emphasize the partisan undercurrent in this
case.
B. How the Court Will Likely Rule
Justices Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor will most likely vote to
strike down the Gestational Age Act based on their reasoning in
Hellerstedt.190 Based on the dissents in June Medical, Justices Thomas,
Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh will likely vote to uphold the statute,

183. The only clinic in the state doesn’t offer abortions after sixteen weeks. Brief for
Respondents, supra note 105, at 6–7. Arguably, the lack of clinics available to perform abortions
past sixteen weeks means women who desire an abortion from week sixteen onwards are not
affected by the statute. However, these women’s legal rights are still altered by the law, regardless
of the factual circumstances within the state. Additionally, the law still imposes a substantial
obstacle in preventing their abortion access—the obstacle is just rendered moot by the presence
of an additional obstacle (the Clinic not providing services after 16 weeks).
184. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 16, at 1.
185. See June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2136 (2020) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring) (siding with the plurality in striking down the abortion restriction, though solely on
stare decisis grounds).
186. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 3, at 1.
187. See Kate Shaw et al., Fourth Dimension Feminism, STRICT SCRUTINY, at 8:57 (Dec. 1,
2021), https://strictscrutinypodcast.com/podcast/fourth-dimension. In this podcast episode, law
professors Kate Shaw, Melissa Murray, and Leah Litman note that Justice Barrett’s presence on
the Court likely motivated Mississippi’s decision to pursue a more aggressive stance on
overturning Roe and Casey.
188. See supra notes 106 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 139–141 and accompanying text.
190. See generally Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016) (citing Casey
and Roe favorably and striking down a restriction affecting both pre- and post-viability abortions).
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and likely to overturn Roe and Casey.191 Justice Barrett—a conservative
justice who has previously indicated support for the pro-life
movement,192 will likely side with the other conservative Justices,
potentially lending a decisive fifth vote.
Despite his dissent in Hellerstedt, Chief Justice Roberts’s
concurrence in June Medical suggests that his allegiance to stare decisis
may prevent him from siding with the other conservative Justices.193
Such a concurrence would only affect the outcome if it enticed another
conservative Justice to sign on, creating a 4-2-3 split. Justice Kavanaugh
is the most likely target.194 However, given Justice Kavanaugh’s
supportive framing of Mississippi’s position as a “neutral” middle
ground justified by the Constitution’s “silence” on abortion,195 it
appears just as likely that he could vote to overturn Roe and Casey
entirely.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Roe and Casey are unlikely to survive in their current form. Dobbs
presents an opportunity for the Supreme Court’s conservative wing to
untether the judiciary and state legislatures from nearly five decades of
precedent on abortion restrictions, and the Court will most likely take
this opportunity in some form. Based on oral argument, a wholesale
overturning of these cases is more likely than not. Although the
ultimate form of the Justices’ opinions is still to be determined, Dobbs
likely signals the end of Roe and Casey’s hold over all prohibitions on
pre-viability abortions.

191. See generally June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2142–53 (2020) (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (stating that the restriction should be upheld); id. at 2153–71 (Alito, J., dissenting)
(rejecting the undue burden standard as applied in Hellerstedt and by the majority in the present
case); id. at 2171–82 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court lacked the power to strike
down the law); id. at 2182 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (agreeing with Justice Alito).
192. See Adam Liptak, Amy Coney Barrett, Trump’s Supreme Court Pick, Signed AntiAbortion Ad, N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/01/us/amy-coneybarrett-abortion.html.
193. Compare Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2330 (Alito, J., dissenting) (disagreeing
with the majority’s undue burden approach in a dissent joined by Chief Justice Roberts), with
June Med., 140 S. Ct. at 2134–36 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (concurring with the
majority on stare decisis grounds despite disagreeing with the majority’s “balancing” approach to
the undue burden test).
194. See Kate Shaw & Melissa Murray, Hysterical Lady Brains, STRICT SCRUTINY, at 8:30
(May 24, 2021), https://strictscrutinypodcast.com/podcast/hysterical (discussing whether Justice
Kavanaugh would be open to a less forceful rejection of Roe and Casey).
195. See supra notes 142–143, 153–154 and accompanying text.

